Why hobbes is wrong
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Morgane Griveaud. This content was originally written for an undergraduate or Master's program. It is published as part of our mission to showcase peer-leading papers written by students during their studies. Bibliography: Baumgold, D. Hobbes, T. Tuck, R. Please Consider Donating Before you download your free e-book, please consider donating to support open access publishing.
Download PDF. Subscribe Get our weekly email. In doing this, I review his three principal reasons for conflict within the state of nature. I argue that his mechanistic reduction of human behavior and motivation is over-generalized and focus on the emphasis he places on instrumental power. I then review his description of zero-sum mentality in relation to trust between individuals and attempt to articulate a phenomenology of trust that appreciates the complexity of human interactions.
I attempt to refute his reasoning by making an appeal to human empathy and its moral dimensions in relation to glory-seeking behavior that Hobbes stipulates. In every way, this is a situation remedied by the establishment of civil society. His philosophical project requires a psychological description of human beings that is conducive to a humanity that is sufficiently rational and capable of obeying the sovereign for the sake of peace Piirimae, , pp.
This conceptualization of humanity is neither fundamentally egoistic nor altruistic. It is effectively pluralistic in a way that reflects the heterogeneous environment of a state of nature whose atmosphere is saturated in adverse experiences and based on a principle uncertainty.
It is a world necessarily inhabited by Hobbesian man whose moral existence, in the contractarian sense, is predicated on the authority of the state apparatus that is effectively illustrated by substantial penalties for violations of the social contract, of hierarchically imposed consensus, and intended harmony. Without this authority, individuals gravitate toward a state of perpetual conflict and depravity, endlessly fighting over resources whose scarcity is assured by diametric opposition between individuals.
This is the presumed war of all born out of self-preservation. I will consider the material and temporal constraints of our behaviors and the motivations behind them in light of their circumstantial quality.
In particular, I will focus on the emphasis Hobbes places on instrumental power concerning competition within the state of nature. I will argue that he operates off a homogenous definition of instrumental power as it relates to his concept of felicity. In light of the complexity within the state of nature, a categorically heterogeneous conception of instrumental power is more suitable and better appreciates the depths of human agency.
A phenomenology of trust will also be explored that appreciates the complexity of this agency in relation to diffidence. I will attempt to refute these by demonstrating that they are ad hoc hypotheses arrived at by a mathematized methodology that Hobbes implements.
I will demonstrate how the notion that moral consensus cannot happen in a state of nature, according to Hobbes, does not follow when one considers human sentiment and the innate empathetic capacity that informs human interactions. Critics of Hobbes often accuse him of grossly oversimplifying the human psyche. This is, an appeal, no less, to a venerate description of the human mind that celebrates its irreducible complexity and indeterminate depth and potential.
There is no room in this picture for beings wholly and reliably preoccupied with a continual struggle for existence in an egotistical fashion. However, Hobbes never intended to prove a presumption of human nature, but to provide a counterfactual justification for the state apparatus and a stable existence within political society Piirimae, , p.
The rhetorical emphasis he placed on the calamitous social and political dimensions of human behavior, often contingent on his materialism, usually dissuades readers from careful analysis of his constructive arguments Browning, , p.
His materialist description of human beings, which is described early on in his Leviathan , where he compares human organs to basic mechanical components, is a literary device that does just that Wolff, , p.
Apart from his mechanistic materialism, however, his reduction of the felicitous motivations of human beings can be seen as problematic. He describes human behavior as a series of motions toward objects of desire at the risk of underestimating the remarkably complex and often unpredictable aspects of agentic capacities.
Nevertheless, this reduction is a philosophical underpinning that informs the composition of conflict within his stipulated state of nature, particularly concerning competition and resource scarcity. He provides three principal reasons for conflict:. While his critics often accuse him of oversimplification with his concept of felicity, the complexity and unpredictable quality of agency inform his stipulation of competition in the state of nature.
Despite variable physicality, our innate and inescapable mortality has a remarkably equalizing effect. However, we rarely observe this equality and often make fictitious downward comparisons. We assume that we are better than most. The idea that we are vulnerable, can pale in comparison to our inflated sense of invincibility. As a result, conflict ensues because of this competition for limited resources.
Malnes , however, rightly asserts that general scarcity is not the only cause of competition according to Hobbes. The instrumentality of power, as it relates to personal security and insatiable desires, is a coercive force in its own right. The net result of principle scarcity and instrumental power is a description that Hobbes believes is emblematic of all human interactions in a state of nature. However, this is a continuation of his mechanistic reduction of human behavior in a generalized form, and his conception of instrumental power is categorically homogenous as it relates to objectified desire and felicity.
He recognizes that people pursue both immediate and future gratification, but he does not navigate the full complexity of these two extremities concerning a categorically heterogeneous conception of instrumental power as it relates to variable object scarcity. For instance, consider water in a desert; it can serve to quench an immediate thirst and satisfy one later if it is stored. There is a temporality inextricably linked to the desired object observed by an agent on some conscious level.
Much like the dramatic revolutions, radical theorists like Hobbes and Locke come to mind easily, while moderates like Montesquieu and Burke do not provide easy answers to hard questions about reform. The process of building and changing liberal regimes requires investing in a better understanding of the complicated web of considerations associated with large states. A better understanding of theorists like Montesquieu and Burke will provide better answers, albeit more complicated ones.
Tags: government liberty rights. The king is dead, long live chaos! Why Hobbes was wrong and Burke was right. May 30, Government Philosophers Political Science The 17th and 18th centuries marked a turning point in Atlantic history that caused the Western world to move from governments run by absolute monarchs to governments run by and for the people.
Hobbes, Locke, and the Social Contract Hobbes stripped inequality down to its most brutish element: strength. Rousseau saw societies divided by inequality and prophesised their downfall.
If we want to live together peacefully, Hobbes argued, we must submit ourselves to an authoritative body with the power to enforce laws and resolve conflicts. Politics is characterised by disagreement and if we think that our own political or religious convictions are more important than peaceful coexistence then those convictions are the problem, not the answer. Hobbes had seen the horrors of the English Civil War up close and civil war remains the most compelling illustration of his state of nature.
Today, readers are often inclined to dismiss his ideas as overly bleak — but that probably says more about us than him. Hobbes saw lasting peace as a rare and fragile achievement, something that those of us lucky enough never to have experienced war are worryingly liable to forget. But much of human history has been war-torn, and unhappily there are still many people who live in states ravaged by conflict and war — in such cases, Hobbes speaks through the ages.
Rousseau thought not, and accused Hobbes of mistaking the characteristics of his own society for timeless insights into our nature. On the Hobbesian analysis, an authoritative political state is the answer to the problem of our naturally self-interested and competitive nature. Rousseau viewed things differently and instead argued that we are only self-interested and competitive now because of the way that modern societies have developed.
For Rousseau, everything started to go wrong once humans perfected the arts of agriculture and industry, which eventually led to unprecedented levels of private property, economic interdependence, and inequality.
Inequality breeds social division. Where societies had once been united by strong social bonds, the escalation of inequality soon turned us into ruthless competitors for status and domination. In his secularised retelling of the Fall, the advent of economic inequality takes the place of our ejection from the Garden of Eden. It remains one of the most powerful indictments of modern society in the history of western thought.
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